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Summary 
How many "American jobs" have U.S.-born workers lost due to immigration and 
offshoring? Or, alternatively, is it possible that immigration and offshoring, by promoting 
cost-savings and enhanced efficiency in firms, have spurred the creation of jobs for U.S. 
natives? We consider a multi-sector version of the Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) 
model with a continuum of tasks in each sector and we augment it to include immigrants 
with heterogeneous productivity in tasks. We use this model to jointly analyze the impact of 
a reduction in the costs of offshoring and of the costs of immigrating to the U.S. The model 
predicts that while cheaper offshoring reduces the share of natives among less skilled 
workers, cheaper immigration does not, but rather reduces the share of offshored jobs 
instead. Moreover, since both phenomena have a positive "cost-savings" effect they may 
leave unaffected, or even increase, total native employment of less skilled workers. Our 
model also predicts that offshoring will push natives toward jobs that are more intensive in 
communication-interactive skills and away from those that are manual and routine intensive. 
We test the predictions of the model on data for 58 U.S. manufacturing industries over the 
period 2000-2007 and find evidence in favor of a positive productivity effect such that 
immigration has a positive net effect on native employment while offshoring has no effect on 
i t .  W e  a l s o  f i n d  s o m e  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  o ffshoring has pushed natives toward more 
communication-intensive tasks while it has pushed immigrants away from them. 
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Abstract
How many "American jobs" have U.S.-born workers lost due to immigration and oﬀshoring? Or, alterna-
tively, is it possible that immigration and oﬀshoring, by promoting cost-savings and enhanced eﬃciency in
ﬁrms, have spurred the creation of jobs for U.S. natives? We consider a multi-sector version of the Grossman
and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) model with a continuum of tasks in each sector and we augment it to include
immigrants with heterogeneous productivity in tasks. We use this model to jointly analyze the impact of
a reduction in the costs of oﬀshoring and of the costs of immigrating to the U.S. The model predicts that
while cheaper oﬀshoring reduces the share of natives among less skilled workers, cheaper immigration does
not, but rather reduces the share of oﬀshored jobs instead. Moreover, since both phenomena have a positive
"cost-savings" eﬀect they may leave unaﬀected, or even increase, total native employment of less skilled
workers. Our model also predicts that oﬀshoring will push natives toward jobs that are more intensive in
communication-interactive skills and away from those that are manual and routine intensive. We test the
predictions of the model on data for 58 U.S. manufacturing industries over the period 2000-2007 and ﬁnd
evidence in favor of a positive productivity eﬀect such that immigration has a positive net eﬀect on native
employment while oﬀshoring has no eﬀect on it. We also ﬁnd some evidence that oﬀshoring has pushed
natives toward more communication-intensive tasks while it has pushed immigrants away from them.
Key Words: Employment, production tasks, immigrants, oﬀshoring
JEL Codes: F22, F23, J24, J61.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The relocation of jobs abroad by multinationals and increased labor market competition due to immigrant
workers are often credited with the demise of many manufacturing jobs once held by American citizens. While
it is certainly true that manufacturing production and employment, as a percentage of the total economy, have
declined over recent decades in the U.S., measuring the impact of globalization on jobs has been diﬃcult. The
reason is that, on the one hand, oﬀshoring some production processes or hiring immigrants to perform them
directly reduces the demand for native workers, while on the other hand the cost-savings of such restructuring of
production increases the productivity and size of ﬁrms and improves their competitiveness. As a consequence,
this process may indirectly increase the demand for native workers, if not exactly in the same tasks that were
oﬀshored and given to immigrant workers, then certainly in tasks that are complementary to them. Several
recent papers have emphasized the potential cost-savings eﬀect of oﬀshoring (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg
2008, Harrison and McMillan 2008, Wright 2010) arguing that this eﬀect could oﬀset or even reverse the "direct
displacement eﬀect" on employment and thereby generate a non-negative eﬀect on the employment of less
educated native workers. Other papers (Peri and Sparber 2009, Peri 2009) have suggested that immigrants
may generate similar productivity-enhancing eﬀects by increasing the demand for less educated native workers,
especially in production tasks that are complementary to those performed by immigrants.
This paper develops a model and presents empirical evidence with respect to 58 U.S. manufacturing industries
over the period 2000-2007, making progress on two important questions. First, how did the decrease in oﬀshoring
and immigration costs, accompanied by the higher share in jobs contested by oﬀshore and immigrant workers,
aﬀect the employment of native workers within the manufacturing sector? Second, what kinds of production
tasks suﬀered most from the competition created by oﬀshore and immigrant workers and what kinds of tasks
beneﬁted? Our model features a manufacturing sector in which native, immigrant and oﬀshore workers compete
to perform a range of productive tasks in each manufacturing industry. Building on Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg (2008) the model predicts that lower costs of oﬀshoring and immigration in an industry will increase,
respectively, the share of oﬀshore and immigrant workers in production in that industry. However, since those
workers perform their tasks at a lower cost for the ﬁrm, an increase in the share of "globalized" jobs also leads
to an expansion of the industry (productivity eﬀect), an increase in total employment in it and possibly even
an increase in the overall employment of native workers (though not their share within the industry). The
model, by arraying productive tasks from manual- and routine-intensive to cognitive- and non-routine-intensive
and postulating that the productivity of immigrants and the cost of oﬀshoring are, respectively, decreasing and
increasing along this spectrum, provides predictions on the range of tasks that will be performed by immigrants,
those that will be oﬀshored, and those that will be performed by natives. Moreover, the model makes predictions
regarding the impact on the "average task" (in the spectrum) performed by natives (and immigrants) and on
2their level of employment when oﬀshoring and immigration costs decline.
The model focuses on employment eﬀects. It assumes a manufacturing economy with many industries and
one factor (unskilled workers) that is mobile across industries and another (skilled workers, or knowledge, or
capital) that is ﬁxed for each industry. In this way, all the testable eﬀects of oﬀshoring and immigration that
diﬀer across industries are translated into diﬀerential employment eﬀects (for natives) due to the fact that
since wages are equalized across industries the common eﬀect on wages cannot be estimated. In particular, the
model makes three main predictions with respect to employment and the average tasks performed by natives
and immigrants. First, in equilibrium each industry oﬀshores the "intermediate tasks" (in the manual-routine
to cognitive-non-routine spectrum), hires immigrants for the more manual-routine tasks, and hires natives for
t h em o r ec o g n i t i v e - n o n - r o u t i n eo n e s .A sar e s u l t ,ad e c r e a s ei no ﬀshoring costs increases the range of oﬀshored
tasks, reducing the share of tasks performed by natives and immigrants, pushing natives towards more cognitive-
intensive tasks and immigrants towards more manual-intensive tasks. Second, a decrease in immigration costs
increases the share of tasks performed by immigrants, reduces those that are oﬀshored by absorbing some of
the most manual-intensive tasks previously done oﬀshore, but has only a small or no eﬀect on the share of
employment (and the average task) of native workers. Immigrants, in other words, compete more with oﬀshore
workers than with native workers due to their more "extreme" specialization in manual jobs relative to natives,
who are concentrated in the communication-cognitive part of the spectrum. Thus, lower immigration costs lead
to substitution of immigrants for oﬀshore workers. Third, and most importantly, lower costs of oﬀshoring and
immigration produce cost-savings and, therefore, productivity-enhancing eﬀects for the industry. This increases
total labor demand, oﬀsetting either partially or totally the negative eﬀect on the labor share of natives so that
total native employment of less educated workers may be unaﬀected or may even expand as a consequence of
either of these forms of cost-savings.
We test the predictions of the model using employment data from two diﬀerent sources. The American
Community Survey (ACS) data (2000-2007) allow us to measure the employment of natives and foreign-born in
manufacturing for each of 58 industries in the U.S. Next, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) dataset on the
operations of U.S. multinationals allows us to measure employment in U.S. multinational aﬃliates abroad for the
same 58 industries over the same period. We then look at the impact of increased ease of oﬀshoring and ease of
immigration on each type of employment in an industry (immigrants, natives and oﬀshore workers). Motivated
by Feenstra and Hanson (1999) we deﬁne the "ease of oﬀshoring" as the share of intermediate inputs that is
imported, and we construct the measure by combining the initial oﬀshoring by a country in an industry with the
subsequent total growth in oﬀshoring in the country. This measure thus varies across industries and over time.
Following Card (2001) we measure "ease of immigration" as the constructed share of immigrants in an industry,
based on the composition of immigrant workers in the industry by nationality in 2000 and the subsequent growth
3of each national group. The underlying assumption is that these two indicators vary, respectively, with the costs
of oﬀshoring (which varies across industries due to diﬀerences in industry specialization across countries) and
with the cost of immigration (which varies by country of origin and aﬀects industries unevenly according to
the initial distribution of immigrants). We ﬁnd that an increase in the ease of oﬀshoring reduces the share of
both native and immigrant workers in total industry employment while an increase in the ease of immigration
reduces the share of oﬀshore workers with no impact on the share of native workers. However, looking at
employment levels (rather than shares) an increase in the ease of oﬀshoring does not have an eﬀect on the
employment of natives in a industry whereas an increase in the ease of immigration has a positive impact on it.
This is consistent with the existence of a positive productivity eﬀect due to immigration and oﬀshoring within
manufacturing industries. Finally, by matching occupation data from the ACS with the content of "manual",
"communication" and "cognitive" skills (and routine and non-routine activities) from the O*NET database we
can assess the response of the average task performed by native and immigrants workers (on a manual and
routine-cognitive and non-routine scale). Our ﬁnal ﬁnding is that an increase in oﬀshoring pushes the average
task performed by natives toward higher cognitive and non-routine content and the average task of immigrants
toward more manual and routine content. In contrast, an increase in the share of immigrants has no eﬀect on
the average task performed by natives. The empirical results together imply that immigrant workers do not
compete much with natives since they specialize in manual tasks, so that an increase in immigrants is more
likely to reduce the range of oﬀshored tasks in a industry without aﬀecting the employment level and type of
tasks performed by natives. Oﬀshore workers, on the other hand, compete more directly with natives and so an
increase in oﬀshoring pushes natives toward more cognitive-intensive tasks. However, the positive productivity
eﬀect of oﬀshoring then eliminates any negative eﬀect on native employment. We check the robustness of these
results using diﬀerent deﬁnitions of tasks, adding controls and testing the assumption that cross- industry wages
do not vary systematically. An interesting qualiﬁcation to our results is that both the eﬀects on employment and
on the average task are stronger when we restrict oﬀshoring to be primarily vertical (rather than horizontal),
which is the form best characterized by our model since we assume that ﬁrms oﬀshore production in order to
cut costs rather than to serve the foreign market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the novel contributions of this
paper in the context of the existing literature. Section 3 presents the model and derives the main results
and predictions. Section 4 presents the data, describing sources and trends. Section 5 produces the empirical
evidence on the model’s predictions. Section 6 concludes the paper.
42 Literature Review
Several recent papers have analyzed the eﬀect of oﬀshoring on the demand for domestic labor and are relevant
to the present analysis. On the theoretical front, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) provide a simple model
of trade in production tasks and, as mentioned, this model will serve as the framework for our paper. It is
worth mentioning that this theory owes much to previous work on trade in intermediates, including seminal
work by Jones and Kierzkowski (1990) and Feenstra and Hanson (1996), both of whom describe models in which
trade in intermediate goods has consequences for the demand for labor much like that described in Grossman
and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). Recent and relevant empirical work includes Crinò (2010), Harrison and McMillan
(2008), Hummels et al. (2010) and Wright (2010), each of whom have tested some of the implications of existing
theories with respect to the wage and employment eﬀects of oﬀshoring. Crinò (2010), which focuses on services
oﬀshoring, and Hummels et al. (2010), which focuses on Denmark, both ﬁnd positive wage and employment
eﬀects of oﬀshoring for relatively skilled workers, especially those performing more complex production tasks,
but ﬁnd that less skilled workers may suﬀer displacement. Wright (2010) ﬁnds a positive productivity eﬀect of
oﬀshoring for domestic ﬁrms but, on net, an aggregate decline in low-skill employment. Harrison and McMillan
(2008) ﬁnd that a crucial distinction is between horizontal and vertical oﬀshoring (the ﬁrst aimed at serving the
foreign destination market and the second aimed at producing goods that the multinational will then re-import),
with the ﬁrst hurting and the second stimulating domestic employment.
The present paper combines the above literature with the literature on the labor market eﬀects of immigrants
(e.g. Card 2001, Borjas 2003). We propose a common structure to think about these two phenomena (oﬀshoring
and immigration), both consequences of increased globalization. In particular, our model and empirical analysis
address two, previously unanswered questions. First, are oﬀshore workers primarily competing with natives
or with immigrants? And, conversely, is hiring immigrant workers an alternative to oﬀshoring jobs, or do
immigrants compete directly with natives? Second, is the opportunity to hire immigrants and move jobs oﬀshore
a way to increase productivity (by cutting costs) and hence expand production (and possibly total employment)
in an industry? We begin by extending the model from Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) which provides a
simple way to think of these two phenomena within a uniﬁed framework. While the immigration literature has
also analyzed the impact of immigrants on task allocation and productivity (e.g. Peri and Sparber 2009 and
Peri 2009), here we expand on these models by introducing a multi-sector environment and an open economy.
What we ﬁnd is that the joint analysis of immigration and oﬀshoring provides novel insights. In particular,
the model predicts that when production tasks are arranged on a scale reﬂecting their relative complexity,
immigrants end up competing on the low-complexity margin with oﬀshore workers, while native workers are
assigned more complex tasks. As we demonstrate, this result has important and testable implications concerning
the consequences of immigration and oﬀshoring on native employment.
5The only other papers that we know of that tackle the analysis of immigration and oﬀshoring in a joint
framework are Olney (2009) and Barba-Navaretti, Bertola and Sembenelli (2008). The ﬁrst paper assumes
that immigrants are identical to natives and that their variation across U.S. states and industries is exogenous.
Moreover, native workers are assumed to be immobile across states and industries so that increased immigration
or oﬀshoring manifests entirely through wages. We think our model and its derived empirical implementation
constitute a signiﬁcant improvement on the reduced form approach of that study. The second paper presents a
model of immigration and oﬀshoring and tests its implications on ﬁrm-level data for Italy but does not look at
the skill-level of workers and tasks nor at industry-level employment eﬀects.
3 A Labor Market Model of Task Allocation
Consider a small open economy that is active in several perfectly competitive sectors, indexed  =1 .W e
focus on one of these sectors and leave both the sector index  and the time dependence of variables  implicit
for ease of notation. We will make them explicit when we get to the empirics.
The sector employs two primary factors, high skill workers (with employment level ) and low skill workers
(with employment level ), with the former being sector-speciﬁc. The sector is small enough not to aﬀect
the wage of low skill workers.1 Each worker is endowed with one unit of labor. High and low skill workers
are employed in the production of high skill intermediates (called ’-tasks’) and low skill intermediates (called
’-tasks’), which are then assembled in a high skill composite input () and a low skill composite input (),
respectively. The two composite inputs are then transformed into ﬁnal output ( ) by the following Cobb-Douglas
production function
 = 1− (1)
where  is a technological parameter and  ∈ (01). Since the economy is small, the price of ﬁnal output  is
set in the international market.
Each composite input is produced by assembling a ﬁxed measure (normalized to 1)o fd i ﬀerentiated tasks














where ()is the input of task  and 0 is the elasticity of substitution between tasks. An analogous
expression holds for the high skill composite.2
1See Appendix B for an extension of the model in which this assumption does not hold. There we show that, while with
an endogenous native wage immigration and oﬀshoring also have wage eﬀects, the corresponding employment eﬀects discussed in
Section 3.4 remain qualitatively the same.
2In Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) tasks are not substitutable. This corresponds to the limit case of  =0where (2)
63.1 Production Choices
Each -task can be managed in three modes: domestic production by native workers (), domestic production
by immigrant workers () and production abroad by oﬀshore workers (). As we are focusing on a small sector
in a small open economy, the supplies of native, immigrant and oﬀshore workers to the sector are inﬁnitely elastic
at corresponding wages , e  and ∗.W ea s s u m et h a tﬁrms can discriminate between natives and immigrants,
which implies that  and e  are not necessarily equal.3 If a foreign worker immigrates, she incurs a frictional
cost  ≥ 1 in terms of foregone productivity. In other words, an immigrant endowed with one unit of labor
in her country of origin is able to provide only 1 units of labor in the country of destination. Accordingly,
the migration decision entails a choice between earning ∗ in the country of origin or e  in the country of
destination. Positive supply of both immigrant and oﬀshore workers then requires the indiﬀerence condition
e  = ∗.
Low skill native, immigrant and oﬀshore workers are perfectly substitutable in -tasks so that in equilibrium
any -task will be performed by only one type of worker: the one that yields the lowest marginal cost.4 In
contrast, -tasks are assumed to be prohibitively expensive to perform by immigrant and oﬀshore workers. The
underlying idea is that -tasks require language and relational skills that foreign-born workers lack or ﬁnd too
expensive to acquire.5
-tasks are deﬁned so that they all require the same unit labor requirement  when performed by native
workers. If task  is oﬀshored, its unit input requirement is (),w i t h() ≥ 1 and 0() ≥ 0 so that higher
 corresponds to higher oﬀshoring costs. We can think of the index  as capturing the complexity of the task.
Tasks with low  tend to be manual and routine while those with large  are non-manual and complex. The cost
of oﬀshoring the task (its "oﬀshorability") is positively associated with the index. The marginal productivity
of oﬀshore workers is equal to 1[()] and varies across tasks depending on their oﬀshorability. A lower
value of the parameter  ≥ 1, which is common to all tasks, can be used to capture technological progress that
decreases the cost of oﬀshoring. Due to perfect substitutability among the three groups of low skilled workers,
becomes a Leontief production function.
3There is much empirical evidence that, for similar observable characteristics, immigrants are paid a lower wage than natives.
Using data from the 2000 Census, Antecol, Cobb-Clark and Trejo (2001), Butcher and DiNardo (2002) and Chiswick, Lee and
Miller (2005) all show that recent immigrants from non-English speaking countries earn on average 17 to 20% less than natives
with identical observable characteristics. Hendricks (2002) also shows that the immigrant-native wage diﬀerential, controlling for
observable characteristics, is highly correlated with the wage diﬀerential between the US and their country of origin. See, however,
Section 3.4 and Appendix B for a detailed discussion of how the predictions of the model would change were ﬁrms assumed to be
unable to discriminate between native and immigrants workers.
4If native, immigrant and oﬀshore workers were imperfectly substitutable, each task could be performed by ’teams’ consisting
of the three types of workers. Then, rather than full specialization of workers’ types in diﬀerent tasks, one would observe partial
specialization, with the shares of the three types in each task inversely related to the corresponding marginal costs. While in reality
several tasks are indeed performed by a combination of diﬀer types of workers, nonetheless the intuition behind the key results of
the model is better served by assuming perfect substitutability.
5We focus on the extreme case in which -tasks can be performed only by native workers for parsimony. By simply inverting
the  and  indices, our results apply symmetrically to a situation in which -tasks can be performed only by native workers
whereas -tasks can be performed also by immigrant and oﬀshore workers. By analogy the analysis of these extreme cases can be
readily extended to the intermediate case in which immigrant and oﬀshore workers can perform both types of tasks.
7at a s ki so ﬀshored rather than performed by natives whenever oﬀshoring is cheaper:
 ≥ ∗() (3)
Assuming  ∗(0) is necessary for at least some task to be oﬀshored.
Additionally, when assigning tasks to immigrants ﬁrms face a task-speciﬁcc o s t() ≥ 1 implying that
immigrants’ marginal productivity in task  is 1(). We assume that 0() ≥ 0 so that there is a negative
correlation between the complex-non routine intensity of a task and the productivity of an immigrant worker at
performing it. The underlying idea is that immigrants with low levels of education are better at manual-routine
tasks than at complex-communication tasks. We will come back to this issue in the empirics.
A task is assigned to an immigrant rather than a native whenever it is cheaper to do so. This is the case
whenever  ≥ e (), which can be rewritten as
 ≥ ∗() (4)
recalling the indiﬀerence condition e  = ∗.A s s u m i n g ∗(0) is necessary for at least some task to be
assigned to immigrants.
To conclude the comparisons between the diﬀerent production modes we need to state the condition under
which a task is oﬀshored rather than performed by immigrants. This is the case whenever oﬀshore workers are
more productive than immigrants:
() ≤ () (5)
3.2 Task Allocation
Conditions (3), (4) and (5) clearly suggest that the allocation of tasks among the three types of workers depends
on the wages ( and ∗), the sector-speciﬁc frictional cost parameters ( and ), and the shapes of the task-
speciﬁcc o s t s( () and ()). To avoid a tedious taxonomy of sub-cases, we characterize the equilibrium of the
model under a set of "working hypotheses" whose relevance will be discussed in the empirics. Nonetheless, as
the following arguments are general, they can be readily applied to alternative hypotheses.
In particular, we assume that 0() ≥ 0() so that as  increases the diﬃculty of assigning a task to
immigrants rises faster than the diﬃculty of oﬀshoring it. We further assume that (0)   (0) so that the
ﬁrst task is more diﬃcult to oﬀshore than to assign to immigrants. These two assumptions capture the idea that
assigning simple tasks to immigrants incurs a lower set-up cost than oﬀshoring them. However, as the variety
and complexity of tasks increases it is hard to ﬁnd immigrants able to do them, whereas once set-up costs are
paid it is relatively easy to access the marginal oﬀshore worker.
8Denote native, immigrant and oﬀshore marginal costs as  = , ()=∗() and ()=
∗(), respectively. Then, our working hypotheses ensure that, when represented as a function of , ()
and () cross only once, with the former cutting the latter from below. Single crossing then implies that there
exists only one value of  such that ()=() and (5) holds with equality. This value deﬁnes the "marginal
immigrant task"  such that
()=() (6)
For all tasks  ≤  it is cheaper to employ immigrants than oﬀshore workers (i.e. ()  ()). For all
tasks with  ≥  employing immigrants is more expensive (i.e. ()  ()).
Finally, for all three modes to be adopted for some tasks in equilibrium we assume that ()=
()    (1). This allows us to determine the "marginal oﬀshore task"  satisfying (3) with
equality:
 = ∗() (7)
with () ≥ 1.
The allocation of tasks among the three groups of workers is portrayed in Figure 1, where the task index  is
measured along the horizontal axis and the production costs along the vertical axis. The ﬂat line corresponds
to  and the upward sloping curves correspond to () and (), with the former starting from below but
steeper than the latter. Since each task employs only the type of workers yielding the lowest marginal cost,
tasks from 0 to  are assigned to immigrants, tasks from  to  are oﬀshored, and tasks from  to
1 are assigned to natives.
3.3 Employment Levels and Shares
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9Figure 1: Unit Costs Over the Range of Tasks
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Since  ∈ [01],  is also the average price (and average marginal cost) of low skill tasks. Using (7) we can



















This highlights the relationship between  and the bundling parameter Ω in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg
(2008), which we encompass as a limit case when  goes to zero and  goes to inﬁnity–that is, when tasks are
not substitutable and migration is prohibitively expensive. It shows that changes in the migration cost  and
the oﬀshoring cost  that decrease Ω( ) imply improved eﬃciency in low skill labor usage. This is the
source of the productivity eﬀects of migration and oﬀshoring discussed in Section 3.4.
Taking into account the diﬀerent marginal productivity of the three groups of workers, the amount of labor
10demanded to perform task  is
 ()=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
()()0 ≤  
()()  ≤  
()  ≤ 1
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1− 0 is a combination of parameters and exogenous variables and the exact price
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1−
(10)
Note that  is the number of immigrants employed whereas, due to the frictional migration cost, the
corresponding number of units of immigrant labor is . Hence, sector employment is  =  ++.























While (6) and (7) identify the marginal tasks as cutoﬀsb e t w e e nt a s k sp e r f o r m e db yd i ﬀerent groups of workers,
the distinction is not so stark in reality. For the empirical analysis, it is therefore also useful to characterize





























We are interested in how marginal and average tasks, as well as employment shares and levels, vary across the
three types of workers when oﬀshoring and migration costs change.













These highlight the adjustments in employment occurring in terms of the number of tasks allocated to the three
groups of workers. They can be readily interpreted using Figure 1. For example, a reduction in oﬀshoring
costs (lower )s h i f t s() downward, thus increasing the number of oﬀshored tasks through a reduction in
both the number of tasks assigned to immigrants (  0) and the number of tasks assigned to natives
(  0). Analogously, a reduction in the migration costs (lower )s h i f t s() downward, thus increasing
the number of tasks assigned to immigrants through a decrease in the number of oﬀshored tasks (higher ).













These are driven by compositional changes due to adjustments both in the number of tasks allocated to the three
groups and in the employment shares of the diﬀerent tasks allocated to the three groups. Note that changes in
migration costs have no impact on the average native task ( =0 ). The impact of oﬀshoring costs on the
average oﬀshore task () is, instead, ambiguous. This is due to opposing adjustments in the allocation of
tasks given that when  falls some of the additional oﬀshore tasks have low  (i.e.  falls) while others have
high  (i.e.  rises).
12Looking at (11), the impacts of declining  and  on employment shares are all unambiguous. By making
oﬀshore workers more productive and therefore reducing the price index of oﬀshore tasks relative to all tasks,
al o w e ro ﬀshoring cost  reallocates tasks from immigrants and natives to oﬀshore workers. By reducing the
price index of immigrant tasks relative to all tasks, a lower migration cost  moves tasks away from oﬀshore



















We call these the "relative productivity eﬀects" on low skill workers.
Finally, turning to the impact of declining  and  on employment levels, expressions (9) reveal an additional
eﬀect beyond the substitution among groups of workers in terms of employment shares. This is due to the fact
that lower  and  ultimately cause a fall in the price index  of the low skill composite because, as a whole,
low skill workers become more productive. We call this the "absolute productivity eﬀect" on low skill workers.
Speciﬁcally, as is evidenced by the term ()
− 1
1− on the right hand side of (9), a fall in the price index of the
low skill composite has a positive impact on sectoral employment (through the absolute productivity eﬀect),
which is then distributed across groups depending on how the relative price indices ,  and 





cannot change when ,  and  are all ﬁxed. This is why we have chosen not to collect the  terms in
(9), allowing us to disentangle the absolute and relative productivity eﬀects.
The impact of declining  and  on employment levels can be signed only when the absolute productivity
eﬀect and the relative productivity eﬀect go in the same direction. In particular, since   0 and







while the signs of , ,  and  are generally ambiguous. In other words, whether
the absolute productivity eﬀect is strong enough to oﬀset the relative productivity eﬀect for all groups of
workers is an empirical question that we will address in the next sections. Lower  and  certainly raise sector
employment  =  +  + , since only the absolute productivity eﬀect matters in this case.
As a ﬁnal comment, it is worth pointing out that ﬁrms’ ability to discriminate between natives and immigrants
is crucial for the productivity eﬀects of easier immigration to materialize. Indeed, when ﬁrms are able to
discriminate, they pay immigrant wages e  = ∗ so that any reduction in the migration cost  allows them to
reduce their payments to immigrants. This generates a cost saving eﬀect both at the intensive margin of tasks
already assigned to immigrants and at the extensive margin of new tasks shifted from oﬀshore to immigrant
13workers. If ﬁrms were, instead, unable to discriminate, immigrants would always be paid native wages  earning
rents −∗. Thus, any reduction in  would simply increase immigrants’ rents with no impact on ﬁrms’ costs.
The diﬀerence between falling costs of immigration with and without discrimination is that in the former case
they create rents for domestic ﬁrms whereas in the latter case they create rents for the immigrants. Note,
however, that our assumption of perfect discrimination is not crucial to generate the productivity eﬀect due
to immigration since even partial discrimination generates rents for the ﬁrm. See Appendix B for additional
details.
4D a t a
In order to make the predictions of the model operational we need to provide an empirical deﬁnition and
empirical measures for three sets of variables. First, we need to measure the employment of less-skilled workers
in each industry-year, identifying separately native workers operating in the U.S. ( for domestic), immigrant
workers operating in the U.S. ( for migrants) and workers operating abroad for U.S. multinationals or sub-
contracting for them ( for oﬀshore). Second, we need a measure of the average intensity of production tasks
performed by less-skilled native workers (), oﬀshore workers () and immigrant workers (). Third, we
need to construct an index or a proxy for the oﬀshoring costs  and for the immigration costs  by industry in
each year. It turns out that to produce these variables using a consistent and comparable industry classiﬁcation
we need to merge data on multinational employment from the BEA, data on imports of intermediate goods from
Feenstra et al. (2002) and data on native- and foreign-born workers from the IPUMS samples of the Census and
the American Community Survey. The only years for which this merge can be done consistently and reliably
are the years 2000-2007, and we therefore use these as our sample. We will describe each set of variables and
their trends and summary statistics in the sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 below. Section 5 then uses these variables
to test empirically the main predictions of the model.
4.1 Employment and Shares
The data on oﬀshore employment are obtained by adding up two groups of workers. We start with data on U.S.
Direct Investment Abroad from the BEA which collects data on the operations of U.S. parent companies and
their aﬃliates. From this dataset we obtain the total number of employees working in foreign aﬃliates of U.S.
parent companies, by industry of the U.S. parent. These are jobs directly generated abroad by multinationals.
However, of growing importance are jobs created as multinationals oﬀshore production tasks to foreign sub-
contractors that are unaﬃliated with the multinational, so-called arm’s length oﬀshoring (see Antras, 2003).
We would also like to include these oﬀshored jobs in the count of total oﬀshore employment but we do not have
14a direct measure of them. Hence this second group of oﬀshored jobs is calculated as follows. Assuming that
a large part of the production output of these oﬀshored tasks is subsequently imported as intermediate inputs
by the U.S. parent company, we calculate the ratio of imports of intermediates by the U.S. parent coming from
aﬃliates and employment in those aﬃliates. We then scale the imports of the U.S. parent coming from non-
aﬃliates (data that are also available from the BEA) by this ratio to impute the employment in sub-contracting
companies. This procedure assumes that the labor content per unit of production of sub-contracted intermediate
inputs is the same as for production in U.S. aﬃliates in the same industry. Then we add the employment in
aﬃliates (ﬁrst group) and the imputed oﬀshore employment (second group) to obtain total oﬀshore employment.
Adding the imputed employment increases oﬀshore employment by 60-80% in most industries, conﬁrming the
importance of arm’s length oﬀshoring of production tasks.
The employment of less-skilled native and immigrant workers in the U.S. is obtained from the American
Community Survey (ACS) and Census IPUMS samples (2000-2007)6 obtained from Ruggles et. al. (2008). We
added up all workers not living in group quarters who worked at least one week during the year and have a high
school diploma or less, weighting them by the sample weight assigned by the ACS in order to make the sample
nationally representative. We deﬁne as immigrants all foreign-born workers who were not a citizen at birth.
The relevant industry classiﬁcation in the Census-ACS data 2000-2007 is the INDNAICS classiﬁcation which
is based on the North American Industry Classiﬁcation System (NAICS). Since the BEA industries are also
associated with unique 4-digit NAICS industries we are able to develop a straightforward concordance between
the two datasets. The 58 ﬁnal industries on which we have data and their BEA codes are reported in Table A1
of the Appendix.
The evolution of the share of immigrants and oﬀshore workers in total manufacturing employment and in
some selected industries is shown in Table A2 in the Appendix. Figures 1 and 2 report the distribution of those
shares in each year across the 58 industries and the connecting line shows their average over time. While during
the 2000-2007 period there has been only a modest increase in the overall share of immigrants and oﬀshore
employment in total manufacturing employment (the ﬁrst increases from 12.8% to 14% and the second from
22.3% to 29.3%) diﬀerent industries have experienced very diﬀerent changes in their share of immigrants and
oﬀshore labor among workers. For instance, "Apparel and Textile Mills" has experienced the largest increase
among all industries in the share of immigrant workers (+7.6% of total employment) and at the same time
has experienced an almost identical and negative (-7%) change in oﬀshore employment. On the other hand,
"Plastic Products" has experienced a decline in the share of immigrant employment (-2.3%) and a large increase
(+16.8%) in oﬀshore employment. "Basic Chemicals" experienced the largest increase in oﬀshore employment as
6For year 2000 we use the 5% Census sample. For 2001 we use the 1-in-232 national random sample. For 2002, we use the
1-in-261 national random sample. For 2003 we use the 1-in-236 national random sample. For 2004 we use the 1-in-239 national
random sample. For 2005, 2006 and 2007 the 1-in-100 national random samples are used.
15a percentage of total employment over this period (+30%) and "Other Transportation Equipment" experienced
the largest decline (-32%). The variation across industries, therefore, promises to be large enough to allow us to
identify the diﬀerential eﬀects of changes in the cost of immigration and oﬀshoring on employment, even over
a relatively short period. Table A3 in the appendix shows the percentages of native, immigrant and oﬀshore
employment as of 2007 for some representative industries spanning the range from very high to very low share
of native workers. What can be seen, and is very relevant for our analysis, is that all industries, to diﬀerent
extents, hire immigrants and oﬀshore production. Hence the joint analysis of these two processes can help us
gain a better understanding of the evolution of manufacturing employment.
4.2 Average Task Intensity
Our model assumes that the contribution of less educated workers to production can be represented in a
continuum of tasks that can be ranked from manual-non-complex to non-manual-complex. At the same time we
assume that this ranking is negatively correlated with oﬀshorability and with the productivity of immigrants
in performing tasks. Recent empirical studies (Becker, Ekholm and Muendler, 2007, Blinder, 2007, Ebenstein,
Harrison, McMillan, Phillips, 2009, Jensen and Kletzer, 2007, Levy and Murnane, 2006, Wright, 2010) have
also argued that jobs that are intensive in more routine and codiﬁable types of tasks and less intensive in tasks
requiring communication and cognitive interactions with other people are less costly to oﬀshore. Moreover, Peri
and Sparber (2009) have shown that due to their imperfect knowledge of language and local norms, immigrants
have a comparative advantage in manual-intensive and simple physical tasks and a comparative disadvantage
in communication-intensive and interactive tasks. Combining these two type of studies we rank the tasks ””
from 0 to 1 as progressively having a larger communication-interaction intensity and a lower manual and routine
content. Hence 0 is a task with the highest content of manual-routine skills to be performed and 1 is a task that
requires the highest content of interactive-cognitive skills to be performed. Our assumption is that the cost of
oﬀshoring tasks and the inverse productivity of immigrants in performing them are both positively correlated
with the index, so that they increase as the index progresses from 0 to 1.
While the model identiﬁes "marginal" tasks that establish a cut-oﬀ between production tasks performed
by one group (say immigrants) and another (say oﬀshore workers) the distinction between tasks performed by
diﬀerent groups is not so stark in reality. However, the predictions of the model regarding the impact of shifts
in the cost-curves on the average task index performed by each group are more continuous in nature and can
be empirically tested. Thus, the way in which we impute task performance in an industry is as follows. First,
we associate with each worker (native or immigrant) in industry  the intensity (standardized between 0 and 1)
of each one of ﬁve task-skill measures assigned to the worker’s occupation by the Bureau of Labor Statistics via
its O*NET database. As described in greater detail in the Appendix C we use the original O*NET variables to
16construct the indices for proxying "cognitive", "communication", "interactive", "manual" and "routine" skills.
Those indices capture the intensity (between 0 and 1) of that skill as used in the productive activities performed
in the occupation. By associating with each individual the indices speciﬁc to her occupation (classiﬁed using
the Standard Occupation Classiﬁcation (SOC)) we construct for each individual the index  =("cognitive"+
"communication"+ "interactive"-"manual"-"routine")/5+2/5, ranging between 0 and 1, which identiﬁes on
that scale the position of the typical task supplied by the individual (occupation)7. We then average the index
(weighted by hours worked) across all U.S.-born workers with a high school diploma or less in industry  and year
 to obtain  and across immigrant workers with a high school degree or less to obtain  Our empirical
analysis will be based on the implications derived using these two indices. Hence the range 0 to 1 for the index 
spans a "task space" that goes from the most manual-routine intensive tasks to the most cognitive-non-routine
intensive ones. Because the BEA database does not contain the occupations of oﬀshore workers we are unable
to calculate .
Figures 3 and 4 show the range of variation across industries and the average values of the indices  and .
The average value of the index is quite stable (much more so than the share of employment) which indicates
a slower change in the task-composition (occupational distribution) of natives and immigrants within each
industry. The value of the index, averaging across all manufacturing industries, is around 0.33 for immigrants
and 0.37 for natives. Moreover, averaging over the 7 years for each industry the complexity index is larger for
natives than for immigrants in all but one case. This conﬁrms that natives perform tasks ranked higher by
this index. The standard deviation of the average native index across industries is around 0.025 and similarly
the standard deviation of the average immigrant index is about 0.026. Also, the variation in the growth of the
skill-index over the 7 years across industries is quite limited. For instance, the industry with the largest growth
in  is "Semi-conductor and other electronic components", which experienced an increase in the index of 0.02,
while the largest decrease was -0.009, experienced by "Coating, Engraving and Heat-treating". Hence, over the
period considered (2000-2007) a change in the skill-index of 0.01 in an industry constitutes signiﬁcant variation.
Also notice that, on average, the index for natives  in the entire manufacturing sector increased by 0.003
while the index for immigrants  decreased by 0.003. While this may be due to many factors, an increase in
oﬀshore employment (and in its range of tasks) in the model presented above would have exactly this eﬀect as
oﬀshored tasks would drive a wedge between those performed by natives (whose average index would grow) and
those performed by immigrants (whose index would decrease).
7We have also constructed the index using a subset of those variables, namely omitting, alternatively, "communication", "inter-
active" or "routine" measures. The empirical results are largely unchanged.
174.3 Imputed Oﬀshoring and Immigration
Driving the shifts in employment shares and average skill-indices are the changes in accessibility of oﬀshore
and immigrant workers. In particular, our model has a simple and parsimonious way of capturing changes in
the overall cost of oﬀs h o r i n gi na ni n d u s t r y() and in the overall cost of immigration in an industry ().
As we do not observe industry-speciﬁco ﬀshoring and immigration costs, we construct a measure of imputed
oﬀshoring and imputed immigration that are likely to be driven by changes in those costs, and that also diﬀer
across industries. In particular, following Feenstra and Hanson (1999) we begin by constructing a measure of
oﬀshoring activity by imputing to each industry the share of imported intermediate inputs coming from other
industries that share the same 3-digit NAICS code8. Thus, this measure varies according to the input-output
structure of each manufacturing industry and the diﬀerential degree of oﬀshoring of intermediate inputs. The
data on U.S. imports come from Feenstra et. al. (2002) and are then restricted according to their End-Use
classiﬁcation to consist only of imports destined for use as production inputs.
Next, in order to isolate the variation in this measure that is due only to exogenous variation in oﬀshoring
costs, we alter the oﬀshoring measure further. First, we ﬁrst regress the oﬀshoring measure on country-time
and industry-time ﬁxed eﬀects, and then discard the resulting industry-time coeﬃcients. The country-time
coeﬃcients are then used as the key variation in the new measure. The idea is that variation over time that
is speciﬁc to industries, and that is not due to factors originating abroad, is likely to be "contaminated" with
variation that is endogenous to employment and wages. Primarily we are concerned about U.S.-originating
industry-speciﬁc demand shocks that both increase employment and wages and simultaneously increase the
extent of oﬀshoring.
For each country we then interact the variation over time in country-speciﬁco ﬀshoring with the level of
oﬀshoring across industries in a country in 2000. Summing over countries results in our ﬁnal industry- and
time-varying oﬀshoring measure. Thus, the implicit identifying assumption is that U.S. oﬀshoring is driven
by country-speciﬁco ﬀshoring costs that aﬀect diﬀerent industries in diﬀerent ways depending on their initial
geographical distribution of oﬀshoring. These can be thought of as "push" factors that vary independently of
domestic U.S. demand shocks. We call this measure for industry  and year  "Imputed Oﬀshoring", and
because it depends negatively on oﬀshoring costs () we will sometimes refer to it as the "ease of oﬀshoring".
For immigrants we use an analogous idea. We exploit the observation that foreigners from diﬀerent countries
have increased or decreased their relative presence in the U.S. according to changes in the cost of migrating from
their countries as well as with domestic conditions in their countries of origin. The diﬀerent initial presence of
immigrants from diﬀerent countries in an industry makes that industry more or less subject to those shifts in
8This is the narrow deﬁnition of oﬀshoring from Feenstra and Hanson (1999). As described in that paper this deﬁnition more
closely captures the idea that oﬀshoring occurs when a ﬁrm chooses to have inputs produced abroad that it could otherwise produce
itself.
18cost- and push-factors. Hence we impute the population of each of 10 main groups of immigrants9 using the
initial share of workers in the industry combined with their total population growth in the U.S., assuming that
cross-country diﬀerences in immigration are solely driven by changes in cost- and push-factors. We calculate
the imputed immigration index by industry as the imputed share of foreign-born in total employment. We
call this measure for industry  and year  "Imputed Immigration", and because it depends negatively on
immigration costs ( ) we will sometimes call it "ease of immigration". This index is similar to the constructed
shift-share instrument often used in studies of immigration in local labor markets (e.g., Card, 2001, Card and
DiNardo 2000, Peri and Sparber 2009), except that it exploits diﬀerences in the presence of immigrant groups
(from diﬀerent countries) across industries, rather than across localities. The changes in this index, which are
due solely to changes in the country-of-origin speciﬁc immigration costs, will diﬀer across industries due to the
weighting of each country-speciﬁc change by the initial cross-country distribution of workers in an industry.
Finally, we divide each index by its standard deviation across all observations so that the estimated coeﬃcients
can be easily compared.
5 Empirical Speciﬁcations and Results
The strategy in this section is to test the main empirical predictions of the model. In particular, we are interested
in estimating the impact of decreasing oﬀshoring and immigration costs, which should result in a larger amount
of production carried out by oﬀshore workers and foreigners within the U.S., on the employment and task
specialization of natives. As suggested by the model, we will exploit diﬀerences in costs across industries and
over time in order to identify the impact of reduced oﬀshoring and immigration costs on native and immigrant
employment as well as on native and immigrant task specialization.
5.1 Eﬀects on Employment Shares
Our empirical strategy is to ﬁrst estimate the eﬀects of the ease of immigration and oﬀshoring on the share of
native, immigrant and oﬀshore employees among less educated workers. We then analyze the impact on the
employment levels of these groups and then on the task-specialization of natives and immigrants. Using the











 + (Imputed Oﬀshoring)+(Imputed Immigration)+
 (16)
9The ten countries/regions of origin are: Mexico, Rest of Latin America, Canada-Australia-New Zealand, Western Europe,





 + (Imputed Oﬀshoring)+(Imputed Immigration)+
 (17)
Equation (15) estimates the impact of the ease of oﬀshoring and immigration on native workers’ share
of less skilled employment. By including industry eﬀects we only exploit variation within a 4-digit NAICS
manufacturing industry (there are 58 of them) over time. We also control for common year-eﬀects. Hence, any
time-invariant diﬀerence in oﬀshoring across industries and any common trend in oﬀshoring over time will not
contribute to the identiﬁcation of the eﬀect. Less skilled employment is calculated by adding the employment
of natives and foreign-born in the U.S. to the employment of foreign aﬃliates of U.S. companies plus imputed
employment of foreign sub-contractors of U.S. multinationals (arm’s length employment). At ﬁrst we assume
that all oﬀshore employment is less skilled so that the total employment of less skilled workers in an industry
is the sum of native, immigrant and oﬀshore employment. Equation (16) estimates the eﬀect of the ease of
oﬀshoring and immigration on the immigrant share of less skilled employment, and equation (17) estimates the
eﬀect on oﬀshore employment as a share of less skilled employment. From section 3.4 the predictions of the
model are as follows:   0  ≈ 0   0   0   0 and   0 Table 1 reports the estimated
eﬀects on employment shares. Speciﬁcations 1 show the eﬀects of imputed immigration and oﬀshoring on the
share of native workers. Speciﬁc a t i o n s2s h o w st h ee ﬀects on the share of immigrants, and speciﬁcations 3 report
the eﬀects on the share of oﬀshore employment. The upper part of the table reports the estimated coeﬃcients
obtained using employment of less educated workers to calculate the shares. The lower part of the table uses
total employment to calculate shares10. Since the model predicts no impact on the employment of more educated
workers the results presented in the lower part of the table should mirror those in the upper part. Moreover,
as we are not able to separate more and less skilled oﬀshore workers, the lower part of Table 1 provides a check
of the overall employment impact of oﬀshoring on native and immigrant workers when considering labor as one
unique factor of production. The method of estimation used is OLS with industry and time ﬁxed eﬀects and
the reported standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust.
The results are interesting and encouraging as all six predictions of the model are matched by the estimates
that, in turn, are very similar across speciﬁcations (using either less educated or all workers). Looking along
the ﬁr s tr o ww es e et h a ti n c r e a s e do ﬀshoring in one industry implies a signiﬁcant decline in the share of native
employment in that industry, a signiﬁcant decline in the share of immigrant employment and a signiﬁcant
increase in the share of oﬀs h o r ee m p l o y m e n t .T h es i g no ft h e s et h r e ee ﬀects is exactly as predicted in equations
(14) and all the estimates are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0. The intuition for such eﬀects is obtained by
considering a downward shift in the oﬀshoring curve in Figure 1. An increase in the share of oﬀshored jobs,
caused by falling oﬀshoring costs, takes place at the expense of both a lower share of immigrant and native
10In all the reported tables we use the deﬁnition of oﬀshore employment that includes the imputed oﬀshore employment from
non-aﬃliates as deﬁn e di ns e c t i o n4 . 1 .W eh a v er u nt h es a m ea n a l y s i su s i n go n l ye m p l o y m e n ti nt h ea ﬃl i a t e sa so ﬀshore employment
and we obtain similar, but weaker, results.
20employment (both margins are aﬀected). Also of quantitative interest is the fact that an increase in the ease
of oﬀshoring erodes a larger share of native employment relative to immigrant employment. In other words, it
is possible that over the seven years considered (2000-2007) the phases of production that were oﬀshored were
more in competition with native workers than with immigrant workers.
On the other hand, focusing on the second row of Table 1, which reports the eﬀects of the ease of immigration
on employment shares, we observe that an increase in imputed immigration has no eﬀect on the share of
native employment whereas it reduces the share of oﬀshore employment and increases the share of immigrant
employment, both signiﬁcantly. Again, this is as predicted by the model and the intuition for the results is
provided again by Figure 1. A downward shift in the immigration cost curve will increase the share of tasks
performed by immigrants and reduce the share of oﬀshored tasks. However, it will leave the share of native tasks
unchanged because those workers are performing tasks that are higher in the skill-index and not aﬀected by the
shifting margin of immigrant tasks11. This is interesting since it may provide a new explanation for why a large
part of the labor literature (e.g., Card, 2001 or Ottaviano and Peri, 2008) does not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative
impact of immigrants on native employment: on the margin immigrants compete more with oﬀshore workers
than with natives. Conversely, if the share of immigrants were to decrease due to an increase in the cost of
immigration—for instance, due to more restrictive immigration laws—our results imply that the production tasks
relinquished by immigrants are more likely to be substituted by oﬀshore workers than by native workers. Such a
diﬀerential impact of oﬀshoring and immigration on the native share of employment conﬁrms the intuition and
results of the model, which implies that oﬀshored tasks are predominantly in an intermediate position along the
task continuum, between those performed by natives and those performed by immigrants.
The estimated coeﬃcients in the lower part of the table (third and fourth row) and their signiﬁcance are
very similar to those in the ﬁrst and second row. This conﬁr m st h a tm o s to ft h ee ﬀect of oﬀshoring takes place
through its impact on less skilled workers in the U.S. An increase in the ease of oﬀshoring reduces the share of
natives and immigrants in total employment by substituting for those workers via an increase in the share of
oﬀshore workers. On the other hand, an increase in the ease of immigration has only a negative impact on the
share of oﬀshore employment, leaving the native share unchanged.
5.2 Eﬀects on Employment Levels
A second important implication of the model is the existence of a "productivity eﬀect" from hiring immigrant
labor or oﬀshore workers. This arises from the infra-marginal cost-savings generated by their lower wages, from
which it follows that an increase in the ease of oﬀshoring or immigration will result in an increase in the overall
11While the relative productivity eﬀect of a decrease in the cost of oﬀshoring would also imply a decrease in the share of native
workers in employment (as predicted by the comparative statics in 14) this eﬀect is likely to be small. In the ﬁndings here there is
no narrowing of the task range performed by natives, suggesting that the eﬀect is certainly smaller than the negative eﬀect on the
share of immigrant workers.
21demand for less skilled labor. This positive overall eﬀe c t ,c o m b i n e dw i t ht h ee ﬀect on shares described in the
previous section, implies a mitigated, null, or perhaps even a positive eﬀect of oﬀshoring on native employment
or a positive eﬀect of immigration on native employment, as demonstrated in section 3.4. Table 3 presents the























 + (Imputed Oﬀshoring)+(Imputed Immigration)+
 (21)
Following the notation used in section 3,  is the total employment of less skilled native workers in
industry  and year ,  is the employment of less skilled immigrant workers in industry  and year  and
 is the total oﬀshore employment in the industry-year. Finally,  =  +  +  is what we
call overall less skilled employment in the industry-year. Keep in mind that it includes jobs performed in the
U.S. by all ﬁrms and abroad by aﬃliates of U.S. parents and by subcontractors working for aﬃliates of U.S.
parents. From the results of section 3.4 we see that  and  are strongly related to the intensity of the
productivity eﬀect due to increased oﬀshoring and increased immigration, while the other eﬀects combine this
productivity eﬀect with the relative share eﬀects estimated in Table 1.
The results presented in Table 2 are also very much in line with the predictions of the model. First, both
when considering the employment of less educated workers as well as the total employment impact (last column
of Table 2) we estimate a positive and signiﬁcant productivity eﬀect of imputed immigration and oﬀshoring.
An increase of one standard deviation in the ease of oﬀshoring increases the total employment of less educated
workers by 2% and increases total employment by 1.53%. An increase in the ease of immigration of one standard
deviation increases employment of less educated workers by close to 1% and total employment by 1.25%. These
productivity eﬀects together with the eﬀects on shares imply that oﬀshoring has a null eﬀect on employment
of less educated natives, while immigration actually increases this employment by 1.2 to 1.3% (coeﬃcients in
the ﬁrst column of Table 2). Moreover, while increased oﬀshoring has a negative eﬀect on employment of
less educated immigrants (-2.75% for one standard deviation, but only in the estimates that use less educated
workers), an increase in immigration does not aﬀect total oﬀshore employment (the productivity eﬀect cancels
out the negative share eﬀect). Lastly, increased ease of oﬀshoring and immigration signiﬁcantly increase the
employment of oﬀshore workers and the employment of immigrants, respectively.
Interestingly, the presence of such a productivity eﬀect due to immigration and oﬀshoring, as predicted by
22our model, implies that even taken together these two forms of globalization of labor have not harmed native
employment in the manufacturing industries that have been most exposed to them. To the contrary, allowing
these industries to save on the tasks supplied by immigrants and oﬀshore workers has promoted an expansion of
these industries relative to others and has ultimately led to increased demand for native workers, relative to a
scenario in which all tasks were performed by natives. Using the estimates in Table 2 for all workers, we can also
gauge the magnitude of these eﬀects: an industry whose ease of oﬀshoring and ease of immigration increased by
2 standard deviations above the average (which would be a relatively large increase in globalization) would have
experienced employment growth of 2-3% above average growth over the 2000-2007 period. This is a signiﬁcant
eﬀect, particularly if we keep in mind that manufacturing employment actually decreased over this period.
5.3 Eﬀects on Average Skill Intensity
Our model also carries predictions regarding the eﬀect of increased oﬀshoring and immigration on the average
task "index" performed by natives and immigrants. To make these predictions empirically operational we have
followed the lead of previous empirical studies (Blinder, 2007; Jensen and Kletzer, 2007; Peri and Sparber,
2009) that have indicated that tasks that intensively use cognitive-communication and non-routine skills are
harder to oﬀshore and, furthermore, that immigrants have a comparative disadvantage (lower productivity) in
performing them. Similarly, we follow the literature (Levy and Murnane, 2006; Becker, Ekholm and Muendler,
2007; Peri and Sparber, 2009) that indicates that jobs that are more intensive in routine and manual tasks are
easier to oﬀshore and immigrants have higher productivity in them. Hence, as described in section 4 above, we
construct the averages  and  for each industry and for domestic and immigrant workers separately. Thus,
the distribution of workers across tasks is based on the task-skill content of each occupation, as assessed by
O*NET, and on the distribution of workers across occupations within industries, as revealed in the American













where the explanatory variables are the share of oﬀshore employment,  and the share of immigrant employ-
ment,  and the dependent variables are the average task indices. Both task indices and shares are calculated
for workers with a high school degree or less. We estimate the eﬀect on the average skill index, in Table 3, by
2SLS using the imputed oﬀshoring and immigration indices (described in section 4.3) as instruments for the
shares  and  Empirically, then, we observe the average intensity of tasks used by workers in an industry
w h e r ew eh a v er a n k e dt h o s et a s k so naz e r ot oo n ei n t e r v a la c c o r d i n gt ot h ei n d e x, which increases as the
23cognitive-non-routine intensity grows and decreases as the manual-routine intensity grows. As a result, if the
costs of oﬀshoring and the inverse productivity of immigrants are positively correlated with this index then the
predictions of the model can be tested using this index.
Table 3 focuses only on the eﬀects on the summary indices  and . We have also performed analysis of
the eﬀect on each index separately (communication, cognitive, manual, routine) obtaining results consistent with
those described below. However, sometimes the results using individual indices are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Since the index is a latent variable, combining the information from the ﬁve variables described in section 4.2
may improve the ﬁt with the theoretical model, hence the stronger signiﬁcance of the results. The method
of estimation is 2SLS, using imputed oﬀshoring and immigration as an instrument for the share of oﬀshore
employment and for the share of immigrant employment. The ﬁrst stage is only moderately strong, as the
F-test of the instruments is 8.75 for the share of oﬀshore employment and 10.79 for the share of immigrant
workers. The ﬁrst column in Table 3 shows a positive eﬀect of oﬀshoring on the skill-index of natives but a
negative eﬀect of immigration on the skill-index of natives. Neither eﬀect, however, is signiﬁcant. The second
column shows the opposite eﬀect with respect to the index of immigrants: increased oﬀshoring decreases the
average skill index of immigrants (-0.07) while an increase in immigration increases the average skill index of
immigrants (+0.20). This time the eﬀects are signiﬁcant. In conformance with the model, an increase in the
share of oﬀshore employment has opposing eﬀects on the average index of natives (increased) and immigrants
(decreased). Oﬀshored jobs place a wedge in the skill-index between jobs performed by natives and those
performed by immigrants. In contrast, an increase in the ease of immigration has a positive eﬀect on the
average index of immigrants (pushing them to more complex tasks) and a negative and not signiﬁcant eﬀect on
the index of natives. This is consistent with the model in which oﬀshore workers take the "intermediate" tasks
so that an increase in immigrant employment shares will increase the average skill index of immigrants, pushing
it closer to that of natives, but have no eﬀect on the average native skill index. The last column reports the
eﬀect of increased immigration and oﬀshoring on the diﬀerence in the average (native-immigrant) index. As
predicted by the model, and conﬁrming the results in columns 1 and 2, a higher share of oﬀshore employment
increases the diﬀerence in the average native-immigrant skill index ( − ). In contrast, an increase in the
share of immigrants is associated with a decrease in that index. Both eﬀects are signiﬁcant and, once again,
in line with the idea that increased oﬀshoring will polarize the specialization of natives and immigrants, while
increased immigration will push the average immigrant task closer to that of natives.
245.4 Extensions and Checks
5.4.1 Horizontal versus Vertical Oﬀshoring
A recent study by Harrison and McMillan (2008) has emphasized that in order to correctly identify the eﬀects
of oﬀshore employment on domestic employment one needs to distinguish between horizontal and vertical oﬀ-
shoring. In particular, increased horizontal oﬀshoring, in which companies move production abroad to serve the
local market (and reduce or eliminate trade costs) hurts domestic jobs in their analysis. Combined with the
fact that horizontal oﬀshoring is not explicitly captured by our model, this suggests eﬀort should be made to
eliminate this eﬀect from our data. On the other hand, vertical oﬀshoring, in which companies transfer abroad
some stages of production and then re-import the intermediate goods, corresponds more closely to our model
of tasks oﬀshoring. This form of oﬀshoring is found to be beneﬁcial to domestic employment by Harrison and
McMillan (2008).
In our sample we are able to identify those industries for which re-exporting to the headquarters, as opposed
to generating purely local sales, is the more important activity for the aﬃliates. Using the BEA data we
calculate the aggregate value of exports from aﬃliates to headquarters as well as the total value of local sales
of aﬃliates. Then we consider as vertically integrated those industries that exhibit an import-to-local-sales
ratio larger than the median value for manufacturing (0.2). Table 4 reports the eﬀects of ease of immigration
and ease of oﬀshoring when we limit the sample to vertical oﬀshoring, as measured in this way. This reduces
the sample to 168 observations. The patterns identiﬁed in Table 4 reproduce the aggregate patterns from the
previous section, with some diﬀerences. First, for these industries the positive overall employment (productivity)
eﬀect of oﬀshoring (last column) is stronger than in Table 2 and stronger than for immigration. Second, this
strong overall productivity eﬀect produces a positive and signiﬁcant (rather than a null) eﬀect of oﬀshoring on
native employment, a result that was not observed when considering all manufacturing industries. Third, the
eﬀects of increasing ease of immigration are smaller. The corresponding estimates for industries that practice
horizontal oﬀshoring, i.e. are deﬁned by a low import-to-local-sales ratio (not reported) show instead a weak
(not signiﬁcant) productivity eﬀect due to oﬀshoring and a small negative eﬀect (also not signiﬁcant) on native
employment. Hence, and in accordance with our model, the productivity eﬀect seems to proceed from an
international segmentation of productive tasks motivated by the desire to lower production costs, as evidenced
by the results for the case of vertical (rather than horizontal) oﬀshoring.
Finally, Table 5 shows the eﬀects on the average task indices for natives and immigrants when we split the
sample between industries that practice vertical or horizontal oﬀshoring. The estimates in the upper part of the
table, referring to industries engaged in vertical oﬀshoring, are similar to those of Table 3. There is, possibly,
an even larger eﬀect due to vertical oﬀshoring (relative to all oﬀshoring) in increasing the diﬀerence between
the average task index of natives and immigrants, while the eﬀect of increased ease of immigration is as before.
25This conﬁrms that vertically integrated ﬁrms tend to oﬀshore intermediate tasks, assigning to natives the most
complex tasks and to immigrants the most routine ones. In contrast, this pattern is not present across industries
that are engaged in horizontal oﬀshoring. These results conﬁrm those of Harrison and McMillan (2008) while
also conﬁrming that the mechanism described in our model is more akin to the process of vertical oﬀshoring.
5.4.2 Wage Eﬀects
Our model and empirical strategy have examined employment across industries in order to capture the produc-
tivity consequences of immigration and oﬀshoring. However, in the presence of imperfect mobility of workers,
or barriers to transferring skills from one industry to another, a portion of the industry-speciﬁce ﬀects of immi-
gration and oﬀshoring could be captured by wage (rather than employment) diﬀerentials. While the American
labor force is highly mobile geographically, as well as across industries, in the short run wages may not be
perfectly equalized.
To address this issue we perform three checks, shown in Table 6. In that table we focus on the eﬀects on
native employment among less educated workers as the variable of interest. In speciﬁcation (2) we estimate the
eﬀects of variation in the ease of oﬀshoring and the ease of immigration on native employment while controlling
for native wages (in the industry-year)12. The data on wages by industry can be constructed from individual
data available from the IPUMS ACS 2000-2007 (Ruggles et al, 2008). While this regression should identify the
impact on employment, once we control for wage changes, wages are endogenous in the model and this may
induce bias in the estimates. Nevertheless the estimated coeﬃcients on native employment are very similar to
those obtained in the basic speciﬁcation: they show a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of ease of immigration,
and no eﬀect of ease of oﬀshoring, on native employment. An alternative method is to check directly whether
industry wages are aﬀected by oﬀshoring and immigration by running a speciﬁcation like 18, except using the
average wage of less educated natives (rather than their employment) in the industry as the dependent variable.
This is what we do in speciﬁcation (3). Finally, we can run regression 18 using as the dependent variable the
total labor income to less educated workers in the industry (the product of the average wage times employment)
and interpret the coeﬃcients as the eﬀects on total native labor demand. This is what we do in speciﬁcation
(4). The results are quite clear and consistent. They show a positive eﬀect of ease of immigration on native
labor demand and no eﬀect of ease of oﬀshoring on it. The positive eﬀect of immigration is reﬂected in a
positive employment eﬀect and no wage eﬀect, while oﬀshoring has neither employment nor wage eﬀects on
natives. These results conﬁrm that the assumption of inter-sector mobility of workers is reasonable and that
the cross-sector productivity eﬀects take the form of employment (rather than wage) diﬀerentials.
12Speciﬁcation (1) in Table 6 reports the reference estimates that are identical to those in Table 2 column 1.
266C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper analyzes the eﬀect of increased globalization, in the form of less-costly oﬀshoring and increased
immigration into the U.S. labor market, on employment in U.S. manufacturing. As mentioned in the introduction
there are very few attempts to combine analyses of immigration and oﬀshoring on labor markets. However,
analyzing each of these in isolation misses the possibility that hiring immigrants or oﬀshoring productive tasks,
rather than hiring a native worker, may be alternatives that are simultaneously available to ﬁrms. Here we
develop a simple extension to the model by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) in order to analyze the
allocation of productive tasks (arrayed from the most manual and routine-intensive to the most cognitive and
non-routine intensive) between native, immigrant and oﬀshore workers. We test the predictions of the model on
U.S. data from 58 manufacturing industries over the years 2000-2007. The results are interesting and point to
an interpretation that is consistent with our model. First, less educated immigrants are employed in the more
manual-routine tasks and on average do not compete within the occupations in which the bulk of native workers
are employed, which tend to be more non-routine and cognitive intensive. In fact, immigrants compete more
with oﬀshore workers. This implies that increased immigration induces ﬁrms to move production from oﬀshore
workers to immigrants. At the same time, and as predicted by our model, immigration seems to generate cost-
savings for ﬁrms, and thus a corresponding increase in productivity, so that its aggregate eﬀect on the level of
low skilled native employment is positive.
Similarly, we ﬁnd that increased oﬀshoring reduces the share of native employment in an industry while, at
the same time, also stimulating overall industry employment via the productivity eﬀect such that oﬀshoring has
no aggregate impact on the level of native employment. Thus, in spite of the widely held belief that immigrants
and oﬀshoring are reducing the job opportunities of natives, we instead ﬁnd that industries with a larger increase
in global exposure (through oﬀshoring and immigration) fared better than those with less exposure in terms
of native employment growth. One important qualiﬁcation is that both the productivity eﬀect and the shift
of native workers towards more complex tasks are found to be stronger in those industries that are engaged
in vertical oﬀshoring rather than horizontal oﬀshoring. This corresponds to the structure of our model which
focuses on the international fragmentation of diﬀerent stages (tasks) of production by cost-minimizing, vertically
integrated ﬁrms.
27References
Antecol, Heather, Deborah A. Cobb-Clark and Stephen J. Trejo, (2001). "Immigration Policy and the Skills
of Immigrants to Australia, Canada, and the United States," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 2001-26,
Claremont Colleges.
Antras, Pol (2003) "Firms, Contracts, and Trade Structure" Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 118 No. 4,
pp. 1375-1418
Barba Navaretti, Giorgio, Giuseppe Bertola and Alessandro Sembenelli (2008) "Oﬀshoring and Immigrant
Employment - Firm-Level Theory and Evidence" Centro Studi Luca d’Agliano Development Studies Working
Paper No. 245.
Becker, Sasha O., Ekholm, Karolina and Marc-Andreas Muendler (2009) "Oﬀshoring and the Onshore Compo-
sition of Tasks and Skills" EFIGE Working Paper.
Blinder, Alan (2007) "How Many U.S. Jobs Might Be Oﬀshorable?" CEPS Working Paper No. 142.
Borjas, George J. (2003) “The Labor Demand Curve is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the Impact of Immi-
gration on the Labor Market” Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXVIII (4), 1335-1374.
Butcher, Kristin F. and John DiNardo (2002) "The Immigrant and native-born wage distributions: Evidence
from United States censuses," Industrial and Labor Relations Review,I L RR e v i e w ,I L RS c h o o l ,C o r n e l lU n i v e r -
sity, vol. 56(1), pages 97-121.
Card, David (2001) “Immigrant Inﬂows, Native Outﬂows, and the Local labor Market Impacts of Higher Im-
migration” Journal of Labor Economics, XIX (2001), 22-64.
Card, David & John DiNardo, (2000). "Do Immigrant Inﬂows Lead to Native Outﬂows?," American Economic
Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 360-367.
Chiswick Barry R., Yew Liang Lee and Paul W. Miller (2005) "Immigrant Earnings: A Longitudinal Analysis,"
Review of Income and Wealth, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(4), pages 485-503.
Crino’ Rosario (2010) "Service Oﬀshoring and White-Collar Employment" The Review of Economic Studies,
forthcoming (DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00586.x).
Ebenstein, Avraham, Harrison, Ann, McMillan, Margaret and Shannon Phillips (2009) "Estimating the Impact
of Trade and Oﬀshoring on American Workers Using the Current Population Surveys", NBER Working Paper
No. 15107.
28Feenstra, Robert, Romalis, John and Peter K. Schott (2002) "U.S. Imports, Exports and Tariﬀ Data" The
Center for International Data, UC Davis
Feenstra, Robert and Gordon Hanson (1996) "Foreign Investment, Outsourcing and Relative Wages" in R.C.
Feenstra, G.M. Grossman and D.A. Irwin, eds., The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Papers in Honor of
Jagdish Bhagwati,C a m b r i d e ,M A :M I TP r e s s
Feenstra, Robert and Gordon Hanson (1999) "The Impact of Outsourcing and High Technology Capital on
Wages: Estimates for the United States 1979-1990" Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Grossman, Gene and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg (2008) “Trading Tasks: A Simple Theory of Oﬀshoring.” American
Economic Review, 98 (5), pp. 1978-1997.
Harrison, Ann and Margaret McMillan (2008) "Oﬀshoring Jobs? Multinational and U.S. Manufacturing Em-
ployment" NBER Working Paper.
Hummels, David, Rasmus Jorgenson, Jackob Munch and Chong Xiang (2010) "Wage and Employment Eﬀects
of Outsourcing: Evidence from Danish Matched Worker-Firm Data" Manuscript, Purdue University, May 2010.
Jensen, Bradford J. and Lori Kletzer (2007) "Measuring Tradable Services and the Task Content of Oﬀshorable
Services Jobs" Manuscript, University of California, Santa Cruz.
Jones, Ronald W. and Henryk Kierzkowski (1990) "The Role of Services in Production and International Trade:
A Theoretical Framework" in R. Jones and A. Kruegers, eds., The Political Economy of International Trade:
E s s a y si nH o n o ro fR o b e r tE .B a l d w i n ,O x f o r d :B a s i lB l a c k w e l l
Levy, Frank and Richard J. Murnane (2006) "How Computerized Work and Globalization Shape Human Skill
Demands" First International Conference on Globalization and Learning Conference Volume.
Mataloni, Raymond J. and Daniel R. Yorgason (2002) "Operations of U.S. Multinational Companies" Survey
of Current Business March 2002, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Olney William W. (2009) "“Oﬀshoring, Immigration, and the Native Wage Distribution” Manuscript, University
of Colorado, Boulder, Social Science Research Network (SSRN) Working Paper No. 1365288, September 2009.
Ottaviano Gianmarco I.P. and Giovanni Peri (2008) "Immigration and National Wages: Clarifying the Theory
and the Empirics” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper #14188, July 2008.
Peri, Giovanni (2009) "The Eﬀect of Immigration on Productivity: Evidence from U.S. states" NBER Working
Paper, November 2009.
29Peri, Giovanni and Chad Sparber (2009) “Task Specialization, Immigration and Wages”, American Economic
Journal: Applied Economics, Vol 1:3.
Ruggles, Steven , Matthew Sobek, Trent Alexander, Catherine A. Fitch, Ronald Goeken, Patricia Kelly
Hall, Miriam King, and Chad Ronnander (2008). Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 3.0
[Machine-readable database]. Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota Population Center [producer and distributor], 2004.
http://www.ipums.org.
Wright, Greg C. (2010) "Revisiting the Employment Impact of Oﬀshoring", UC Davis Dissertation
A Appendix: Endogenous Native Wages
In the main text we have assumed that each sector is not large enough to aﬀect the domestic wage .H e r ew e
discuss how  would react if such an assumption did not hold.
Intuition is better served by focusing on the simple case of an economy with only two sectors indexed  = .
In each sector immigrant, oﬀshore and native labor demands are given by expressions like (9) with corresponding
price indices like (10). The two sectors may diﬀer in terms of oﬀshoring and immigration costs, technological
parameters, demand parameters, goods prices, and speciﬁcf a c t o re n d o w m e n t s . A si nt h em o d e li nt h em a i n
text, goods prices 
 are exogenously determined in international markets and foreign workers are in inﬁnitely
elastic supply at foreign wage ∗. Their utility maximizing decisions determine whether they are employed
as immigrants or oﬀshore workers in the two sectors, or in some other non-modeled occupation abroad. In
contrast to the model in the main text, native workers are now in ﬁxed supply  and their allocation between
sectors is determined, together with their wage , by the clearing of the native labor market: the sum of the
two sectors’ native labor demands has to equal native labor supply (
 + 

 = ). The equilibrium native




corresponding labor demands as in (9).





















































30Figure 2: Endogenous wage determination
The equilibrium of the native labor market is represented in Figure 2. This depicts a standard box diagram in
which the horizontal dimension measures native labor supply , the vertical dimension measures the native
wage, and (log-linearized) labor demands in the two sectors are depicted as decreasing in the native wage from
their respective origins  and . Accordingly, the equilibrium allocation of native workers between the two
sectors and the corresponding common wage are to be found at the crossing of the two labor demand schedules
where, by graphical construction, the native labor market clears. Figure 2 can be used to assess the eﬀects of
changes in migration and oﬀshoring costs on the wage of native workers as well as on their sectoral allocation.
For example, under our working assumptions, a fall in migration costs in sector  (lower 
)d o e sn o ta ﬀect

 and increases 
. This leads to a fall in Ω(
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) shifts the labor demand schedule of sector  upwards increasing the wage of natives and
their employment in sector . The opposite happens when tasks are easily substitutable (larger )a n dt h et a s k








The eﬀect of lower oﬀshoring costs is, instead, more complex as a fall in 
 not only decreases 
 but
also increases 
, thus reducing Ω(

). However, additionally, the native labor demand schedule shifts
upward when tasks are not easily substitutable (small ) and the task bundle contributes a lot to ﬁnal production
(large ), and vice-versa. So, whether easier migration and easier oﬀshoring lead to higher employment and a
31higher native wage is, in the end, an empirical question that depends on sectoral characteristics.
B Appendix: No Discrimination between Natives and Immigrants
In the model presented in the main text, the productivity eﬀect due to easier immigration stems from the fact
that falling costs of immigration create rents for domestic ﬁrms  − ()= − ∗() per unit task
for  ∈ [0 ], just as the productivity eﬀect due to easier oﬀshoring stems from the fact that falling costs of
oﬀshoring create rents for domestic ﬁrms  −()=−∗() per unit task for  ∈ [ ].T h e s e
eﬀects arise because we have assumed that ﬁrms can discriminate between immigrants and natives since they
know the wage ∗ in the country where immigrants come from as well as their common migration cost .
This ability to discriminate is crucial for the productivity eﬀect due to easier immigration to materialize.
The argument can be spelled out following Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). In discussing the diﬀerent
eﬀects of easier oﬀshoring and easier immigration, these authors assume, as we also do, that foreign workers can
stay in the foreign country and earn the wage ∗ or can move to the home country, at the cost of a fraction of
their working time, and earn the wage e . To avoid the existence of corner outcomes with no migration or inﬁnite
migration, they also assume that foreign workers are heterogeneous in terms of their moving costs. Speciﬁcally,
a foreign worker  captures only a fraction 1() of e  w h e ns h em o v e st ot h eh o m ec o u n t r y . W i t h o u tl o s s
of generality, foreign workers can be indexed in increasing order of moving costs so that 0()  0.M o r e o v e r ,
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) assume that immigrants are as productive as natives and that domestic
ﬁrms are not able to discriminate between natives and immigrants nor between immigrants with diﬀerent moving
costs.
In terms of our notation, all these assumptions imply ()=1and e  = . They also imply that the marginal
immigrant  earns the same net income in both locations so that  = ∗(). This replaces our condition
e  = ∗ in the main text and uniquely determines , which in turn determines the number of immigrants given
some distribution of foreign workers across moving costs.
To sum up, when ﬁrms are unable to discriminate, native, immigrant and oﬀshore marginal costs become
 = , ()=∗() =  and ()=∗(), respectively. Accordingly, an inframarginal
immigrant earns rents −∗(). This implies that as the common immigration cost  falls, additional
rents are created at both the intensive and the extensive task margins. Accordingly, new immigrants enter the
home country ( increases). More rents also accrue to the incumbent immigrants, but not to the home ﬁrms
whose proﬁtability, therefore, does not change. "The diﬀerence between falling costs of oﬀshoring and falling
costs of immigration is that the former create rents for domestic ﬁrms ... whereas the latter create rents for the
immigrants" (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008).
In contrast, when ﬁrms can discriminate between natives and immigrants they fully appropriate the rents.
32Figure 3: Immigration rents
Ruling out oﬀshoring for simplicity, in our model the rents per unit task when cheaper immigrants are employed
instead of natives amount to
 − ()= − ∗()
so that total rents correspond to the striped area in Figure 3. Being entirely appropriated by ﬁrms, these rents
are the source of the productivity eﬀect due to immigration. Note that our assumption of perfect discrimination
is not crucial in order to generate a productivity eﬀect due to immigration–as long as there is any degree of
discrimination some rent is generated.
CA p p e n d i x : T a s k D a t a
By merging occupation-speciﬁc task values with individuals across years, we are able to obtain these task-
intensity measures for natives and immigrants by education level in each state over time. The U.S. Department
of Labor’s O*NET abilities survey provides information on the characteristics of occupations. This dataset
assigns numerical values to describe the importance of 52 distinct employee abilities (skills) required by each
occupation13 as well as 40 distinct employee "Activities" (tasks). We then re-scale each skill and task variable
so that it equals the percentile score in 2000 (between 0 and 1) representing the relative importance of that
skill-task among all workers in 2000. For instance, an occupation with a score of 0.02 for a speciﬁc skill
13Classiﬁed using the Standard Occupation Classiﬁcation (SOC).
33indicates that only 2 percent of workers in the U.S. in 2000 were supplying that skill less intensively. We
then assign these O*NET percentile scores to individuals from 2000 to 2007 using the ACS variable occ1990,
which provides an occupational crosswalk over time. The indices "cognitive", "communication" and "manual"
are constructed by averaging the Ability variables. Speciﬁcally, "cognitive" includes 12 variables classiﬁed as
"Cognitive and Analytical", "communication" includes four variables capturing written and oral expression and
understanding, and "manual" includes 19 variables capturing dexterity, strength and coordination. Finally,
the variable "interactive" includes three activities that emphasize person-to-person interaction while "routine"
includes four activities that emphasize the importance of doing routine tasks.
D Appendix: Construction of Oﬀshoring Cost Variable
W eu s ea nu p d a t e dv e r s i o no ft h eo ﬀshoring measure described in Feenstra and Hanson (1999), deﬁned formally
for any industry k purchasing inputs j as:


(industry k purchases of good j)(
intermediate imports of good j
total domestic intermediates consumption of j)


(industry k purchases of good j)
Here, we need to separate imports of ﬁnal goods from imports of intermediates in constructing the ratio in
the numerator. The data source for these imports and their classiﬁcations is Feenstra et al (2002). While the
measure itself is constructed at the 4-digit North American Industry Classiﬁcation System (NAICS) level, within
these NAICS categories are more disaggregate Harmonized System (HS) categories, and these are associated
with end-use codes that characterize imports according to their ﬁnal use. In short, these end-use codes are used
by the BEA in generating the National Income and Product Accounts, and here we use them to select only
goods intended for use as intermediates (see Wright, 2010 for more details).
Next, domestic consumption of intermediates by industry is constructed as imports of intermediates minus
exports of intermediates (restricted in the same manner as imports) plus domestic shipments of intermediates.
This ﬁnal value needs a brief explanation. Rather than use the total domestic shipments of industry j, we
instead apportioned those domestic shipments into various HS products by assuming that the share of domestic
shipments for each HS product within industry j equals the share of U.S. exports in that HS product and
industry. We then sum domestic shipments over just those HS products that are also intermediate inputs (as
deﬁned by their end-use classiﬁcation).
The other component of the measure consists of industry input purchases, which are obtained from the
Materials Purchases tables in the1997, 2002 and 2007 Economic Censuses, with values in intervening years
obtained via interpolation between these. Finally, the 4-digit NAICS measure is merged to BEA industries
using a concordance created by the authors.
34E Appendix: Construction of Oﬀshore Employment Variables
Our measures of oﬀshore employment draw from data on the employment and exports of aﬃliates of U.S.
multinational corporations (MNCs) from the BEA, U.S. Direct Investment Abroad: Operations of U.S. Parent
Companies and Their Foreign Aﬃliates, 2000-2007. According to Mataloni and Yorgason (2006), MNC output
in 1999 accounted for around half of manufacturing output and 63 percent of manufacturing exports. We also
restrict the sample further by using only majority-owned, non-bank MNC aﬃliates, however this restriction is
minor. The quality of this data has been investigated by Harrison and McMillan (2008) using inward FDI data
from Germany and Sweden, and while the authors ﬁnd some discrepancies, these seem to be at least somewhat
explained by diﬀerences in the timing of reporting.
Speciﬁcally, we collect information on multinational aﬃliate employment by industry and year (58 manu-
facturing industries over 2000-2007), imports from MNC aﬃliates to their parents by industry and year, and
imports from non-aﬃliates to U.S. MNCs by industry and year. Aﬃliate employment is also available separately
for "Managerial, professional, and technical employees" and "All other employees", which we use to distinguish
high- and low-skill aﬃliate workers.
In order to calculate total oﬀshore employment due to U.S. MNC oﬀshoring, we begin with the actual
employment of multinational aﬃliates and the aggregate exports of those aﬃliates to the multinational parent
ﬁrm. We then take the ratio of aﬃliate employment to aﬃliate exports for each industry and year. This ratio
is then set aside as a scaling factor, or an export labor requirement, for each industry and year. Next, we
multiply U.S. parent ﬁrm imports from non-aﬃliates with respect to this scaling factor and the result is our
imputed arm’s length oﬀshore employment. This is then combined with the aﬃliate employment values. As





Effects on the shares of natives, immigrants and offshore workers  
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Observations 464  464  464 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Note: The dependent variable in each regression is specified in the first row. The explanatory variables are specified in the first column. The method of 
estimation is Ordinary Least Squares; Imputed offshoring is calculated as the predicted share of intermediate imported in the industry, using the Feenstra 
and Hanson (1999) definition, and a gravity regression with country-specific offshoring costs. Imputed immigration is calculated using the initial employment 
composition in each industry by country and overall population growth by nationality in the US. Both indices are divided by their standard deviation in the 
sample so that a change in one unit of the explanatory variable corresponds to a change of one standard deviation. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. **=significant at the 5% level 37 
 
Table 2 
Effects on the employment of natives, immigrants and offshore workers 
58 manufacturing industries, 8 years: 2000-2007 
 
Note: The dependent variable in each regression is specified in the first row. The explanatory variables are specified in the first column. The method of 
estimation is Ordinary Least Squares; Imputed offshoring is calculated as the predicted share of intermediate imported in the industry, using the Feenstra 
and Hanson (1999) definition, and a gravity regression with country-specific offshoring costs. Imputed immigration is calculated using initial employment 
composition in an industry by country and overall population growth by nationality in the US. Both indices are divided by their standard deviation in the 
sample so that a change in one unit of the explanatory variable corresponds to a change of one standard deviation. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
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Observations 464  464  464  464 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
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Table 3: 
Effects on average task intensity of natives and immigrants. 
2SLS estimates using imputed offshoring and immigration as IV for shares  
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Average Skill  Index “IM” 
for less educated 
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Observations 464  464  464 
Industry Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Note: The dependent variable in each column is the average (employment-weighted) skill index standardized between 0 and 100. In the first 
column it is measured for less educated native workers and in column 2 for less educated immigrant workers. In Column 3 it is the difference 
of the two.  The index is constructed by averaging five indicators in order to produce a variable whose range of variation is one unit, that 
increases with the intensity of cognitive-communication-routine type of tasks and decreases with the intensity of manual-routine tasks. The 
explanatory variables are the share of immigrant and offshore low-skilled workers. The estimation method is 2SLS using the indices of 








Effects on employment: Vertical offshoring industries 
2SLS estimates using imputed offshoring and immigration as IV for shares  
  
 
Note: The dependent variable in the first two rows is the share of (respectively) US-born, immigrant and offshore workers among less educated in the 
industry-year. The dependent variable in the third and fourth row is the logarithmic employment of the corresponding groups by industry-year. The 
explanatory variables are specified in the first column. The method of estimation is Ordinary Least Squares; Imputed offshoring is calculated as the 
predicted share of intermediate imported in the industry, using the Feenstra and Hanson (1999) definition, and a gravity regression with country-specific 
offshoring costs.  Imputed immigration is calculated using initial employment composition in an industry by country and overall population growth by 
nationality in the US. Both indices are divided by their standard deviation in the sample so that a change in one unit of the explanatory variable corresponds 
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Observations 168  168  168  168 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
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Table 5 
Effects on average task intensity: Horizontal versus Vertical offshoring industries 






Average Skill Index 
“ID” for less educated 
Natives 
Average Skill  Index “IM” 
for less educated 
Immigrants 
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                                                   2SLS estimates,  Horizontal Offshoring Industries 
















Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Note: Variables and Specification as in table 3. We separate the estimates of the effect of immigrants and offshoring in industries with high level of 
import from affiliates relative to local sales of affiliates (Vertical offshoring), reported in the first and second row, from those with low level of 
import from affiliates relative to local sales (Horizontal offshoring), reported in the third and fourth row. The index is constructed by averaging five 
indicators in order to produce a variable whose range of variation is one unit, that increases with the intensity of cognitive-communication-routine 
type of tasks and decreases with the intensity of manual-routine tasks. The explanatory variables are the share of immigrant and offshore low-
skilled workers. The estimation method is 2SLS using the indices of offshoring and of immigration as IV for the shares in employment. 
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US Born  (1/100 log 
points) 
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Average wages  Total Labor 
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Observations  464 464  464 464
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Other Controls  NO  Wages of natives  No No 
 
Note:  The dependent variable in specifications (1) and (2) is employment of less educated US-born workers. In specification (3) it is the average wage 
of less educated US born workers and in specification (4) it is the total compensation of less educated US-born workers (wages*employment). The 
method of estimation is Ordinary Least Squares; Imputed offshoring is calculated as the predicted share of intermediate imported in the industry, 
using the Feenstra and Hanson (1999) definition, and a gravity regression with country-specific offshoring costs.  Imputed immigration is calculated 
using initial employment composition in an industry by country and overall population growth by nationality in the US. Both indices are divided by 
their standard deviation in the sample so that a change in one unit of the explanatory variable corresponds to a change of one standard deviation. 






























































































































Figure 3  
Average index for native workers with high school diploma or less (ID)  
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Figure 4  
Average index for immigrant workers with high school diploma or less (IM)  
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1  Animal foods, Grain and oilseed milling  28  Paints, coatings, and adhesives  54  Metalworking machinery 
3  Sugar and confectionery products  30  Plastics products  55  Engines, turbines, and power transmission equipment 
4 
Fruit and vegetable preserving and specialty 
foods  31  Rubber products  57  Computers and peripheral equipment 
5  Dairy products  32  Clay products and refractory  58  Communications equipment, Audio and video equipment 
6  Animal slaughtering and processing  33  Glass and glass products  60 
Semiconductors and other electronic components, Magnetic 
and optical media 
7 
Seafood product preparation and packaging and 
Other food products  34 
Cement and concrete products, Lime and 
gypsum products  61  Navigational, measuring, and other instruments 
8  Bakeries and tortillas  36  Other nonmetallic mineral products  64 
Electric lighting equipment, Electrical equipment, Other 
electrical equipment and components 
10  Beverages  37 
Iron and steel mills and ferroalloys, Steel 
products from purchased steel  65  Household appliances 
11  Tobacco products  39 
Alumina and aluminum production and 
processing  68  Motor vehicles, Motor vehicle parts 
12  Apparel and Textile mills  40 
Nonferrous metal (except aluminum) 
production and processing  71  Aerospace products and parts 
13  Textile product mills  41  Foundries  72  Railroad rolling stock 
15  Leather and allied products  42  Forging and stamping  73  Ship and boat building 
16  Wood products  43  Cutlery and hand-tools  74  Other transportation equipment 
17  Pulp, paper, and paperboard mills  44 
Architectural and structural metals, Boilers, 
tanks, and shipping containers  75  Furniture and related products 
18  Converted paper products  46 
Hardware, Spring and wire products and 
Other fabricated metal products  76  Medical equipment and supplies 
19  Printing and related support activities  48 
Machine shops, turned products, and 
screws, nuts, and bolts  77  Other miscellaneous manufacturing 
23 
Basic chemicals and Other chemical products and 
preparations  49 
Coating, engraving, heat treating, and allied 
activities     
24  Resins and synthetic rubber, fibers, and filaments  50  Other fabricated metal products     
25  Pharmaceuticals and medicines  51 
Agriculture, construction, and mining 
machinery     
26 
Soap, cleaning compounds, and toilet 
preparations  52  Commercial and service industry machinery     
27 
Pesticides, fertilizers, and other agricultural 
chemicals  53 
Ventilation, heating, air-conditioning, and 
commercial refrigeration equipment and 
Other general purpose machinery 




Percentage of offshore and immigrant employment in total manufacturing, and selected industries within it 
 
 
Note: Immigrant, native and offshore employment are calculated as described in the text. These statistics include all workers in the computation of native and 
immigrant employment. 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Percentage  of  
offshored employment in 
Manufacturing 
23.3 22.7 22.5 23.9 24.4  23.3  22.4  29.3 
Percentage of immigrant employment 
in Manufacturing 
12.8 13.7 14.5 14.0 14.1  14.8  15.2  14.0 
Percentage  of immigrants (and 
offshored) in the industry with the 
fastest growing immigrant share 
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Percentage of offshored (and 
immigrants) in the industry with the 


















Percentage  of offshored (and 
immigrants) in the industry with the 
slowest growing offshored share 



































Industries with highest share of US-born employment  
9   89   2   Ship and boat building  
9   87   4   Cement and concrete products, Lime and gypsum products  
9   84   7   Wood products  
12    82    6    Hardware, Spring and wire products and Other fabricated 
metal products  
5   81   14   Pulp, paper, and paperboard mills  
9   80   10   Dairy products  
13   80   7   Machine shops, turned products, and screws, nuts, and bolts 
7    80    14    Iron and steel mills and ferroalloys, Steel products from 
purchased steel  
11   79   10   Architectural  and  structural metals, Boilers, tanks, and 
shipping containers  
13   78   9   Other nonmetallic mineral products  
Industries with intermediate share of US-born employment  
5   68   27   Agriculture, construction, and mining machinery  
12   68   20   Navigational, measuring, and other instruments  
9   67   24   Glass and glass products  
17   65   18   Other miscellaneous manufacturing  
9   65   26   Converted paper products  
11   63   26   average  
4   62   34   Pesticides, fertilizers, and other agricultural chemicals  
20   62   18   Bakeries and tortillas  
8   61   32   Railroad rolling stock  
Industries with lowest share of US-born employment  
13   52   36   Communications equipment, Audio and video equipment  
5   51   44   Household appliances  
15   51   34   Computers and peripheral equipment  
10   50   40   Pharmaceuticals and medicines  
16   49   35   Leather and allied products  
8   45   48   Cutlery and hand tools  
12   43   45   Sugar and confectionery products  
18   43   39   Fruit and vegetable preserving and specialty foods  
5   40   55   Other transportation equipment  
10   37   53   Soap, cleaning compounds, and toilet preparations  
4   28   68   Beverages  
1   19   80   Tobacco products  
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